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Philosophy and Liturgy Part 2 
Liturgy and Epistemology 
 
Abstract: In this article, I summarise recent philosophical work on the philosophy of liturgy. In 
part 2 of this article, I consider how liturgy can provide a way of knowing God personally. I 
outline accounts of acquiring phenomenal-knowledge, practical-knowledge and propositional-
knowledge by participating in liturgy.  
 
Keywords: Liturgy, epistemology, personal-knowledge, phenomenal-knowledge, practical-
knowledge, propositional-knowledge 
 
Introduction 
One of the recurring themes of the recent emerging philosophical work on liturgy is the 
discussion of how participating in liturgy can be a way of knowing. In the first part of this article 
on liturgy and philosophy, I discussed the nature of actions which are performed in the context 
of liturgical worship. Drawing together insights from the recent literature, I suggested that liturgy 
provides a means of acting, and more specifically, a means of engaging God. A natural question 
which follows, is how engaging God in this way can help us to know God. In this second article, 
I consider the question of how liturgy can provide a way of knowing.  
Whilst liturgy and epistemology might appear not to be natural conversation partners, as 
much of the recent work on the philosophy of liturgy has shown, participation in the liturgy of 
the Church is one of the primary ways that religious believers come to engage God and to know 
God. In the first part of the article, I gave a detailed overview of what liturgy is and how the 
term is used in the literature. I suggested that liturgy performed in a religious community consists 
of some set of partially scripted, partially improvised, bodily, communal actions, which count as 
instances of engaging God. It’s worth reiterating one point for the purposes of the present 
discussion— liturgy is not something practiced only in formal or traditional Churches. Many of 
the examples used in the literature are from more formal traditions, however, the insights made 
are applicable to most instances of liturgy, however formal or informal it may be. Since this 
article seeks to give an overview of this literature, I will try to be as tradition-neutral as possible, 
whilst remaining faithful to the original contexts and examples used by those writing on the 
topic.1  
 
Knowing God liturgically 
Much of the epistemology of liturgy has been shaped by a central shared belief that, as Cuneo 
puts it, ‘the central aim of the Christian life is not to theorize about God but to know God’ 
(2016, 148). Here, I summarise recent work on the epistemology of liturgy by drawing from 
recent work on what it is to know someone personally.2 Thus, I suggest, participating in liturgy 
provides a means of, and an occasion for, knowing God personally. First, following Eleonore 
Stump (2010), I suggest that a necessary condition for knowing someone personally is having a 
second-personal experience of that person, which allows us to acquire a kind of non-
propositional phenomenal knowledge of them. I then show how liturgy can help to meet this 
necessary condition for knowing God personally, by outlining recent accounts of experiencing 
God by participating in liturgy. Secondly, as recent work by Bonnie M. Talbert (2015) has 
shown, knowing someone well requires more than experiencing them second-personally. If we 
                                                     
1 Moreover, as a referee points out, there is also some normativity in which specifying which rituals and traditions 
are appropriate. For instance, as I highlighted in the first part of the article, both Cuneo and Wolterstorff describe 
some instances of thanking God liturgically as more or less appropriate instances of thanking God. Thus, there may 
be disagreement between traditions on which liturgies are most appropriate.  
2 For recent work on the epistemology of knowing persons see: Benton 2017; Code 2015; Lauer 2014; Stump 2010 
(Chapters 3 and 4); Talbert (2015). 
want to see how liturgy can allow us to know God well and not just be acquainted with God, we 
should consider how liturgy can provide the means for knowing God well. Talbert suggests that 
knowing another person well requires sharing a number of worlds with them (2015, 198-202), 
knowing-how to engage them (2015, 196-97), and knowing about them (2015, 197-198). I show 
how participating in liturgy can help to fulfil these conditions by allowing us to not only know 
God, but also to know him well.  
 
Experiencing God and knowing what God is like  
Whilst analytic epistemology has primarily been concerned with analysing what it is to know 
some fact (for instance, I know that Paris is in France), some philosophers have argued that not 
all kinds of knowledge can be reduced to propositional knowledge. For instance, it has been 
argued, knowing what seeing red is like, or knowing what it is like to be in love, cannot be 
reduced to propositions. Such knowledge is often called ‘phenomenal knowledge’ or ‘object 
knowledge’. Stump suggests that in Frank Jackson’s (1982) thought experiment about Mary, the 
super smart scientist confined to a black and white room with all of the information about 
colour, what Mary learns in seeing a red tomato for the first time, is something about redness—
there is something that it is like to see red, which cannot be captured by knowing only 
propositions about red.3  
Stump thinks the same lesson can be applied to our knowledge of persons. She suggests 
that if Mary were confined to a room with only propositions about other persons, she would 
learn something new in meeting her mother for the first time, when she has a ‘second person 
experience’ (2010, 53) of her mother. Stump writes that, ‘[i]n her first direct and immediate 
encounter with another human being, Mary’s mind is opened to all that we learn and experience 
in face-to-face contact, the complex give-and-take of interpersonal interactions’ (2010, 53). 
Moreover, such experiences appear to be necessary for knowing someone personally. In reading 
only propositions about someone, I might come to know plenty about that person, but until I 
experience them, I cannot be said to know them. Whilst there are clearly differences between 
Mary’s experiencing her mother and her experiencing God (she cannot put her arms around 
God, or see his physical shape), Stump’s insight into the nature of personal knowledge is helpful 
for our understanding of liturgy. For as some philosophers have supposed, liturgy allows us to 
experience God second-personally and to gain non-propositional knowledge of what God is like. 
Stump suggests that this kind of phenomenal knowledge of persons helps to explain 
what we come to know in reading narrative. Just as we cannot reduce our knowledge of persons 
to some set of propositions about a person, a summary of propositions about a piece of 
literature would fall short of capturing what we come know in engaging with this text. Moreover, 
Stump suggests, ‘the knowledge of persons is that it can be transmitted by means of stories’ 
(2015, 217). Telling stories allows us to ‘re-present the experience itself in such a way that he can 
share the second-person experience to some degree with someone else who was not part of it’ 
(2015, 217).  
This observation, that narratives provide us with a kind of non-propositional personal 
knowledge has obvious applications to thinking about the epistemology of liturgy. As James 
K.A. Smith notes, ‘Liturgies are compressed, repeated performance narratives that, over time, 
conscript us into the story they “tell” by showing, by performing’ (2009, 109). Much of the 
epistemological discussion of liturgy focuses on how engagement with the narrative of liturgy 
can provide a way of knowing God. For instance, Stump argues that one of the primary ways in 
which the Eucharist allows for engagement with God is through the narrative which is contained 
with it. She writes, 
 
                                                     
3 There are some philosophers who think that what Mary acquires is not a kind of phenomenal knowledge or a kind 
of propositional knowledge, but, rather, she acquires a kind of know-how of how to identify redness (Lewis, 2004). 
For an overview of these different accounts, see Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar 2004. 
The moving knowledge of persons with respect to Christ mediated by the story which 
originally brought Paula to second-person experience of Christ is there again for her in 
every instance in which Paula participates appropriately in the Eucharist. …every time 
she participates in the rite, she will find that, however inclined she is to give up on herself 
or on God, God is still there, still loving her, still wanting her to come into union with 
himself…with every participation in the Eucharist, Paula will be strengthened for 
perseverance, in virtue of growing in love of God and in experience of God’s continued 
love and presence to her. (2015, 223-224) 
 
Whilst a narrative model can help to explain the nature of our experience of God in liturgy, care 
is needed in thinking about how best to capture this kind of narrative experience which takes 
place. As Nicholas Wolterstorff draws attention to in his earlier work, we cannot think of liturgy 
only in terms of dramatic re-enactment, since this ‘displaces the focus from the actuality of what 
is presently taking place’ (1990, 146); ‘The celebrant actually blesses; he does not play the role of 
Christ blessing’ (1990, 146). Cuneo, in his essay on liturgical immersion, attempts to provide 
such an account, which allows for the role of narrative knowledge, yet does not depict our 
engagement as mere re-enactment. As he summarizes his position,  
 
Participating in liturgical re-enactment…is not to engage in the activity of reading a 
narrative-work. It is, rather, to insert oneself into a complex sequence of scripted action 
performance. In its use of various sensory modalities and bodily movement, it is more 
similar to both dramatic performance and the observation of such performance…the 
activity called for is not that of pretending to be a disciple present at the rite or 
pretending to be present at the rite in one’s own person. Rather, what the script calls for 
is that those assembled attend to and take up a vantage point within the core narrative, 
screening-off various features of the presentation of this narrative and sometimes certain 
features of the narrative itself. (2016, 82) 
 
As Cuneo goes on to argue, the purpose of this kind of immersion is for participants to engage 
with the narrative of the Christian gospel in such a way that their identities are challenged and 
revised by God through the liturgy (2016, 87).4 This seems to be very close to Stump’s account 
of narrative experience and liturgy.   
Wolterstorff’s account of acquiring phenomenal knowledge of what God is like focusing 
not on the narratives of Christian liturgy, but, rather, on those aspects of God’s character that 
are taken for granted in the repeated practices which we engage in. Wolterstorff focuses on the 
kind of knowledge that could be gained from our addressing God in liturgy. For instance, in the 
Episcopal liturgy, the participants use the following words:  
 
Eternal God, heavenly Father, 
 you have graciously accepted us as living members 
 of your Son our Savior Jesus Christ, 
 and you have fed us with spiritual food 
and the Sacrament of his Body and Blood. (Wolterstorff, 2010, 56) 
 
According to Wolterstorff, addressing God in this way can allow us to gain knowledge in virtue 
of the things we take for granted. Just as in taking for granted that the world existed before we 
were born, it is possible for us to know that the world existed before we were born, in taking for 
granted certain things about God through our use of liturgy, we can come to know that God is a 
                                                     
4 This account of narrative engagement also comes close to how Smith describes the role of liturgical narrative, 
which I describe in the next section.  
certain way. We can come to know God as being worthy of praise and adoration and as being 
capable of listening to us:  
  
To participate in engaging God liturgically in the form of addressing God is to take God 
to be a ‘thou’ whom it is appropriate to address, to take God to be capable of listening, 
to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration, to take God to be capable of listening, 
to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration… (2016, 13) 
 
Wolterstorff sees his position as complementing Stump’s account of personal knowledge and 
liturgy, as well as adding another way in which liturgy allows us to know God. Moreover, even in 
traditions where no written liturgical script is used, there will be many descriptions of God which 
are repeated and taken for granted by those participating in the liturgy.  
 Finally, a further way in which phenomenal knowledge of God has been depicted in the 
literature is through some kind of direct experience of God, made possible by liturgy. Adam 
Green and Keith A. Quan (2012) have considered the question of how reading Scripture can 
occasion shared-attention experiences with God.5 Whilst their work is not directly related to 
liturgy, there are obvious extensions. Indeed, in work by Joshua Cockayne et al, (2017) it has 
been suggested that the Eucharistic meal might be the means of attention sharing between an 
individual and God. By shared-attention, Green and Quan have in mind the experience of being 
aware of another person’s awareness, a phenomenon which is much discussed in the 
psychological literature.6 Moreover, such awareness moves from being dyadic to being triadic in 
the case that subjects move from attending only to one another, towards mutually attending to 
some object. In the case of Scripture, Green and Quan suggest that the text might allow for a 
kind of triadic attention sharing with God, where the words of the Bible act as mutual object 
perceived between a believer and God, so long as they both aware of one another’s awareness. 
They write that, ‘God might, through the Scriptures, direct one’s attention to one’s pride. … 
God might elect for the contents of Scripture to shape a dyadic experience of the divine. Shared 
attention requires that the agent one is sharing attention with be experienced as present, even if 
implicitly’ (2012, 426). In extending this account of attention sharing, Cockayne et al. (2017) have 
applied this account to experiencing God through the liturgy and practice of the Eucharist. They 
argue that just as a passage or text might be the means of mutual object focusing between an 
individual and God, the words of the liturgical script and the elements might serve as means of 
mutual object focusing, in which individuals are aware of God’s presence and mutually attend to 
his salvific actions (2017, 187). They suggest that in such an experience, ‘what is communicated 
isn’t a set of propositions, but the sacrament will have a different meaning depending on the 
participant’s relation to Christ’ (2017, 187).  
 
Sharing worlds with God 
Whilst experiencing a person second-personally might be necessary for knowing someone, 
knowing someone well requires a deeper and broader kind of experience of that person. For 
instance, as Talbert notes, a brief and intense romance often gives the illusion of knowing 
someone well, but in meeting one another’s families, couples can come to the realisation that 
they don’t know each other nearly as well as they imagined and a broadening of the contexts in 
which they experience one another can broaden and deepen their knowledge of one another 
(2014, 200). Talbert suggests that knowing someone well is rooted in a kind of acquaintance 
knowledge, which is made possible by repeatedly experiencing someone in a variety of contexts 
and environments (2014, 198-202).   
                                                     
5 In his earlier paper, Green (2009) gives a more general account of mystical experience of God understood through 
the lens of shared-attention. These kinds of experience of God might be more prevalent in charismatic and 
pentecostal Churches, even if no written script is used.   
6 See Seemann (ed.), 2011; Eilan, et al. (eds.), 2005.  
 In a recent paper, Cockayne and David Efird (forthcoming) have considered how 
corporate worship might play a role in helping us to know God better in the way Talbert 
describes. Here, the authors consider how Talbert’s criteria for knowing someone personally 
might be fulfilled by participation in corporate worship. Cockayne and Efird pay particular 
attention to the question not just of how liturgy can occasion second-personal experiences of 
God, but how the context of these experiences can be shaped and broadened to provide a 
variety of shared-worlds between a person and God. Rather than thinking only of liturgy as a 
means of sharing attention with God, Cockayne and Efird suggest that liturgy also provides a 
means of sharing attention with other congregants, whilst mutually focusing on God as an object 
of attention. They suggest two ways in which such experience might improve one’s knowledge 
of God. First, they argue, corporate worship can alter our perception of God—just as 
experiencing our friends in different social scenarios changes our perception of what they are 
like, experiencing God alongside other people, with different histories, beliefs and issues, can 
provide us with a broader and deeper knowledge of what God is like, by allowing us to 
experience different aspects of God. Secondly, they suggest, worshipping alongside others plays 
a causal role in what we attend to—thus, in worshipping alongside another person, we are able 
to be drawn to aspects of God’s character and to come to a broader perception of what God is 
like than we would by worshipping alone. Thus, they suggest, corporate worship might also 
allow us to correct certain biases we might have about God’s character and nature.   
 
Knowing how to engage God  
According to Talbert, another important aspect of knowing someone well is that we know-how 
to engage that person. Like phenomenal knowledge, many philosophers have held that knowing-
how to do something (e.g. knowing-how to ride a bike) is not reducible to propositional 
knowledge.7 Moreover, as Talbert suggests, knowing-how to engage someone appears to be an 
important part of knowing them well. In agreement with Talbert, Cuneo observes that, knowing 
someone personally involves knowing ‘how to engage that person’ (2014, 369) and thus, 
‘knowing God consists in (although is not exhausted by) knowing how to engage God’ (2014, 
369). Cuneo suggests that liturgy allows a person to gain a kind of knowledge-how to engage 
God, stating that 
 
liturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting, kissing, prostrating, 
and eating that count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases of blessing, 
petitioning, and thanking God…If this is correct, the liturgy provides the materials for 
not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God. Or more, precisely: the liturgy 
provides the materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a context in 
which she can exercise or enact it….to the extent that one grasps and sufficiently 
understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition, and thank God in 
their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge. (2014, 383)8 
Thus, building on his account of liturgical action which I outlined in the first article, we can see 
that if bodily liturgical actions should count as instances of blessing God, thanking God and 
petitioning God, then repeated engagement in liturgy provides a participant with a kind of 
personal know-how.9  
                                                     
7 For a discussion of the reducibility of know-how to know-that, see Noë 2005; Stanley and Williamson 2001. 
8 Wolterstorff also briefly considers the role of know how (2018, 22-23). 
9 Another interesting contribution to this area of ritual epistemology can be found in Dru Johnson’s (2016, 2018) 
work on scriptural epistemology. Johnson approaches the topic as a biblical scholar but draws his work into 
conversation with contemporary epistemology. As highlighted in part 1 of this article, the question of which actions 
count as instances of blessing, thanking and petitioning God will often be tradition dependent. However, as Cuneo 
highlights, we can make a difference between successfully thanking God and appropriately thanking God (2016, 
157-58). For successfully thanking God, all that is needed is the right sort of intention that one’s bodily action 
Just as repeatedly engaging with another person allows us to know-how to engage them better 
(e.g. we might get better at knowing-how to make someone laugh, or feel at ease), repeatedly 
engaging with God allows us to know-how to engage God better.10  
 This emphasis on practical knowledge in liturgy is something which Smith also stresses, 
albeit through very different means. As I outlined in the first article, Smith’s account of liturgical 
action focuses on the role of liturgy as engaging with our desire through embodied rituals. In the 
context of Christian worship, Smith suggests that this kind of action ‘is fundamentally formative 
because it educates our hearts through our bodies (which in turn renews our mind) and does so 
in a way that is more universally accessible…than many of the overly cognitive worship habits 
we have acquired in modernity’ (2009, 13). He writes,  
 
Discipleship and formation are less about erecting an edifice of Christian knowledge than 
they are a matter of developing a Christian know-how that intuitively “understands” the 
world in light of the fullness of the gospel…The practices of Christian worship are the 
analogue of biking around the neighbourhood, absorbing an understanding of our 
environment that is precognitive and becomes inscribed in our adaptive unconscious. 
(2009, 68) 
 
Whilst liturgy provides us with a kind of know-how, unlike Cuneo’s account, this is not 
explained primarily in terms knowing-how to engage God. Rather, on this account, liturgy 
teaches how to perceive an understand the world in a certain way. For Smith, engagement with 
narrative provides us with a kind of ‘aesthetic know-how’ (2009, 126), which, as he describes it is 
‘more like “knowing” that someone is flirting with you than knowing someone’s shoe size’ 
(2009, 126). Narrative shapes our perception of the world in ‘unconscious automated ways’ 
(2009, 126).11 Yet, this account of know-how also allows us to encounter God in a certain sense. 
Smith explains that 
 
the conceptual metaphors that are “carried” in liturgical practices will, over time, 
sediment into our background in ways that are more aesthetic than logical, more poetic 
than didactic. Carried in such practices will be conceptual metaphors that prime us to 
immediately see God, the world, and others in certain ways. (2009, 123)  
 
                                                     
counts as thanking God. The question of appropriate thanking is a question which may depend on the particular 
tradition one is participating in. Moreover, there will be some disagreement between traditions concerning just 
which instances of thanking God are most appropriate.  
10 A major barrier to the plausibility of Cuneo’s thesis is the question of whether or not intellectualism is true. The 
disagreement between intellectualism (the thesis that all knowing is a species of knowing that) and anti-
intellectualism (the thesis that it is not the case that all knowing is a species of knowing that) is a complex and 
contentious issue that Cuneo can certainly not hope to resolve in twenty pages. However, he gives some 
considerations in favour of what he describes as his ‘moderate view’ (2014, 371), namely, that knowing-how is ‘a 
sequence of act types that an agent can perform’, such as ‘Performing a work of music, swimming the crawl…and 
offer[ing] thanks to God’ (2014, 371). However, regardless of whether or not intellectualism is true, Cuneo’s thesis is 
still important. Cuneo admits that his is not the only way of understanding practical knowledge, and states that 
‘those unsympathetic with the moderate position—say, those who identify knowing how with a special sort of 
knowing that—should feel free to attempt to translate what I say into the idioms that belong to their favored 
version of knowing how’ (2014, 370). Even if know-how is reducible to knowledge-that, typically the intellectualist 
understands gaining know-how as an example coming to know a proposition in a ‘practical mode of presentation’ 
(Stanley and Williamson, 2001, 427) or ‘practical way of thinking’ (Stanley, 2011, 130). Even this very thin notion of 
knowing-how, however, is compatible with Cuneo’s thesis—the individual improves her epistemic state by learning 
how to ride a bike. 
11 Much of the philosophical literature on liturgy overlaps and conflicts with work by ritual theorist. There is a 
varying degree of success in the critical engagement with this literature. Sadly, there is not space here to unpack the 
engagement between these two literatures.  
This account is very close to Coakley’s position on liturgical epistemology. Like both Cuneo and 
Wolterstorff, Coakley suggests that liturgy primarily gives us a kind of knowledge-by-
acquaintance or knowledge-by-relationship (2013, 134). However, she suggests that our personal 
knowledge of God made possible by engagement with liturgy is not like the immediate 
knowledge which is acquired through perception. But, rather, our acquaintance knowledge of 
God is acquired slowly through the repetition of certain practices so that we can come to know 
how to rightly relate to God and to see God.12 She writes that,  
 
the specific, bodily ways in which Christians seek to “perceive” God through liturgy 
involve a range of ramified practices (including hymnody; or “walking in patterns”…) 
that are not merely straightforward analogies of “perception” in “immediate” response to 
God, but complex means of training the mind and senses, over time, in order to come 
into a right relation with God (2013, 137-38).  
 
Smith uses the language of tuning to explain how such transformation takes place (2009, 137). 
Because the liturgies of culture often tune us to see the world in a way which ‘run[s] counter to 
what God envisions for the flourishing of creation’ (2009, 141), we need to be re-tuned by the 
liturgy, which, he suggests, acts as a kind of ‘counter-liturgy’ (2009, 149) to the liturgies of sin; 
‘Christian worship is an intentionally decentring practice, calling us out of ourselves into the very 
life of God’ (2009, 149). Both Coakley’s and Smith’s accounts, combine aspects of practical 
knowledge and phenomenal knowledge—by acquiring knowledge-how to relate properly to 
God, we are able to see the world and God in a new way, and thereby, come to know what God 
is like. 
 Finally, as I highlighted in part 1 of this article, whilst liturgy always involves some kind 
of script (regardless of how formal this is) it also always involves some level of improvisation. 
Indeed, whilst many of the examples used in the literature focus on formal Church liturgies, in 
the case of more informal worship, in the Pentecostal tradition, for instance, the balance is 
weighted more heavily towards improvisation than scriptedness. Whilst this is an area which 
hasn’t been directly addressed in the literature, the importance of liturgical know-how seems 
particularly important in communities in which there is little or no written script. In such a 
context, one must learn how to improvise appropriately, without the aid of a script to guide 
one’s actions. As Smith describes, in any ritual community, there is an irreducible ‘logic of 
practice’ which resists propositional reduction, and which can only be learnt by becoming 
embodied in that community (2013, 76-79). This seems worthy of further exploration in the 
context of more informal liturgy.  
 
 
 
                                                     
12 As a referee helpfully points out, whilst repetition might help to form ritual knowledge, not all religious rituals are 
repetitive. Baptism and circumcision happen only once, for instance. And so, this analysis will not straightforwardly 
explain the epistemology of all liturgy. Whilst there is not space for a detailed discussion of this point, it is important 
to note here that even if some liturgical events happen only once, they are embedded in a wider liturgical story and 
form part of a wider community. Thus, whilst the baptism ritual happens only once in a person’s life, it is repeated 
many times within a community, so some repetition may still be present. Moreover, just as a marriage is a one-time 
event in a relationship which has a profound effect on one’s know-how of one’s spouse, baptism can play a 
significant role in one’s knowing-how to engage God, even if it is not repetitive. The reason being (I assume) is 
because both events (baptism and marriage) are rituals which involve one’s commitment to the task of engaging the 
other person repeatedly for the rest of one’s life. Additionally, as Cuneo describes it, the baptizmal rite is ‘one in 
which the one baptized is understood to undergo transformation’ (2016, 171) in which one becomes disposed 
toward forming certain character traits and forming a greater understanding of Gospel (2016, 181). Such states are 
developed by the Holy Spirit and the community in relation to the bapitzed (2016, 182). Thus, if such a 
transformation takes place, one would surely be more disposed to engage God more, and thereby, to know-how to 
engage God more.  
Knowing about God 
Finally, whilst knowing about someone is not sufficient for knowing someone, it does appear to 
have some importance, especially for knowing someone well. As Talbert suggests, engaging with 
a person, and knowing-how to engage them gives us a great deal of propositional knowledge 
about that person. For example, we can know what she has ‘thought, felt, said, done, perceived, 
and such in our presence’ (2005, 198).  
However, it is interesting to note that work on liturgy as a means of knowing about God 
has been the least developed area of liturgical epistemology. Indeed, many of those working in 
this area are keen to stress that liturgy does not primarily give us information about God. For 
example, Cuneo notes that ‘Christianity is not a body of propositions. Its fundamental aim is not 
to produce agents that form warranted beliefs about God’ (2016, 147-48). And Smith writes, 
‘Being a disciple of Jesus is not primarily a matter of getting the right ideas and doctrines and 
beliefs into your head in order to guarantee proper behaviour…given the sorts of animals we are, 
we pray before we believe, we worship before we know—or rather, we worship in order to know’ 
(2009, 33-34). Whereas the vast majority of philosophy of religion concerns itself with analysing 
the rational defensibility of religious beliefs or explicating the content of Christian doctrine, the 
philosophy of liturgy has resisted this point of focus. There are good reasons for this. Focusing 
only on what we can know about God falls short of knowing God, and so focusing only on the 
propositional content of the Christian faith falls short of giving an analysis of the Christian faith.  
Coakley (2013), in her short essay on truth in liturgy, briefly suggests some ways in which 
liturgy might allow us to acquire propositional knowledge. She suggests that, it might be the case 
that ‘ordinary propositional truth is at stake’ (2013, 133) in the liturgy through the recitation of 
the propositions of Nicene Creed, for instance. She writes that, ‘it could in principle also be that 
liturgy, in virtue of certain repetitive belief-forming practices, could actually mount some kind of 
“justification” thereby for beliefs’ (2013, 134). Coakley quickly moves on from this suggestion to 
consider a ‘deeper’ kind of truth which is acquired through encountering God personally 
through liturgy, yet her briefs remarks provide some account of how propositional beliefs might 
be formed and justified through liturgy.  
Moreover, whilst, as we have seen, Wolterstorff’s primary concern is to give an analysis 
of liturgy and phenomenal knowledge of God, his account could easily be amended to fill out 
Coakley’s suggestion in more detail. Wolterstorff notes that ‘one can use these terms to make 
declarations about God. But that’s not how they are used when they are incorporated into 
address to God’ (2017, 13). However, it seems reasonable to think that in coming to know God 
as almighty in successfully addressing God as almighty, one might also come to know that God 
is almighty. Indeed, given that Wolterstorff suggests that ‘[t]he better one understands the 
meaning of the addressee-identification terms used when addressing God liturgically, the deeper 
one’s knowledge of God—assuming that the terms fit God’ (2017, 14), it would seem to follow 
that one could also come to know about God through the repetition of addressee-identification 
terms.  
Whilst there is little work explicitly concerned with giving an account of knowing about 
God through liturgy, much of what is said assumes that such knowledge follows other kinds of 
knowing, be that phenomenal or practical knowledge. Smith’s concern, for instance, is to shift 
the focus from an overly cognitive understanding of what worship is for to be reframed by his 
anthropology of human beings as desiring, embodied creatures. Yet, the implication of much of 
the liturgical epistemology I have considered is not that belief is not important, but, rather, that 
belief about God is acquired as a result of our embodied practical-knowledge and our knowledge 
of what God is like and not the other way around. Smith suggest that, rather than thinking of 
doctrine informing our understanding of practice, we should rather think that ‘“Doctrines” are 
the cognitive, theoretical articulation of what we “understand” when we pray’ (2009, 70). 
Nevertheless, it still remains true that these connections have not been developed fully in the 
literature, at least not by all of the philosophers cited here, and the question of how liturgy 
furnishes our beliefs about God is a question which deserves further exploration. 
 
Future directions for the philosophy of liturgy 
The philosophical study of liturgy is a very recent phenomenon and there is much still to be said 
in this important area of study. Indeed, in this short article, I have sketched just two areas that 
this literature has engaged with, but there are many other issues which there has not been space 
to outline.  
 I have already noted the lack of focus on propositional knowledge and liturgy, 
particularly in the analytic literate. This area of work points to a deeper, more fundamental issue, 
which Wolterstorff points out: ‘It would be desirable to have a comprehensive discussion of the 
ways in which we come to know God liturgically; such a discussion would identify and analyze 
the different ways, and it would show how these different ways interact with each other’ (2017, 
9). I’ve suggested that much of the work concerning liturgical epistemology fits more broadly 
under the umbrella of personal epistemology. However, the literature on knowing other persons 
is as recent and underdeveloped (if not more so) than the literature on liturgy. Thus, to really 
make progress in understanding how liturgy can allow us to know God personally, it would be 
beneficial to have a firmer grasp on the nature of personal knowledge, more generally. 
 Another epistemological issue which could benefit from further development is the 
social dimension of knowing liturgically. Whilst the work on liturgical action has focused on 
some of the issues involved in acting together, the same kind of attention has not been given to 
thinking about how the social dimension of liturgy impacts our understanding of epistemology. 
The vast literature on group knowledge and common knowledge appears to present a ripe array 
of conceptual analyses which have obvious and important applications to our understanding of 
liturgical epistemology.  
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